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NICHOLS v. UNION UNDERWEAR CO. AND THE
MEANING OF "UNREASONABLY DANGEROUS":
A CALL FOR A MORE PRECISE STANDARD
INTRODUCTION
Since 1966,1 Kentucky has adhered to the doctrine of
strict liability as set out in section 402A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, which holds a seller liable for physical
harm caused by any product sold "in a defective condition un-
reasonably dangerous to the user or consumer."' 2 In Nichols v.
Union Underwear Co., 3 a product liability suit against the
manufacturer-seller of a T-shirt that caught fire when the
child wearing it played with matches, the trial judge in-
structed the jury that "[a] product is 'unreasonably danger-
ous' only if it is dangerous to an extent beyond that which
would be contemplated by an ordinary adult purchaser
thereof, with ordinary knowledge as to its inherent character-
istics.' 4 The instruction was based on comment i to section
402A. 5
' In Dealers Transp. Co. v. Battery Distrib. Co., 402 S.W.2d 441, 446-47 (Ky.
1966), the Kentucky Court of Appeals adopted the language of the RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). In Jones v. Hutchinson Mfg., Inc., 502 S.W.2d 66
(Ky. 1973), the Court specifically applied the doctrine of strict liability to a suit for
defective design of a product.
2 The American Law Institute (ALI) offers the following definition of strict lia-
bility when a consumer is harmed by a seller's product:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dan-
gerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for
physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his
property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without sub-
stantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and
sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered
into any contractual relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
Nichols v. Union Underwear Co., 602 S.W.2d 429 (Ky. 1980).
4 Id. at 432.
' "The article sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be
contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowl-
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Following these instructions, the jury denied the plaintiff
recovery and the Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed the
judgment for the defendant.6 The Kentucky Supreme Court
reversed, holding that the judge had improperly defined for
the jury the concept of an "unreasonably dangerous" prod-
uct.7 Thrusting itself into what has been called the most agi-
tated and controversial question in the field of product liabil-
ity,8 the Court noted that the effect of such an instruction "is
to insulate a product from liability simply because it is pa-
tently dangerous, or because it is no more dangerous than
would be anticipated by the ordinary person."9 Thus the
Court rejected "patent danger" or "consumer expectation" as
an absolute defense to strict liability10 and held that, hence-
forth, in Kentucky, consumer knowledge may be only one of
the factors used to determine whether a product is unreason-
ably dangerous.11
This comment focuses on the rejection of the comment i
consumer expectation test as the sole determinant of an un-
reasonably dangerous product and suggests that while the
Nichols holding moved Kentucky product liability law in a
positive direction, the Court should proceed further. Adoption
of a utility-risk balancing approach, whereby a manufacturer
is held liable if the risk posed to the consumer by the product
is outweighed by the product's benefit to the public, is
advocated.
I. A WORKING BACKGROUND
A. The Rise of the Consumer Expectation Test12
Product liability was first mentioned in a 1944 California
edge common to the community as to its characteristics." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 402A, comment i, at 352 (1965).6 Nichols v. Union Underwear Co., No. 78-CA-759-MR (Ky. Ct. App. April 13,
1979).
7 Nichols v. Union Underwear Co., 602 S.W.2d 429, 432-33 (Ky. 1980).
8 Wade, On Product "Design Defects" and Their Actionability, 33 VAND. L. REV.
551, 576 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Product "Design Defects"].
9 602 S.W.2d at 432.
10 Id.
" Id. at 433.
12 For other treatments of the historical development of the law of product
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case, Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.,13 and was first applied
eighteen years later in Greenman v. Yuba Products, Inc.1 4 In
1965, the American Law Institute (ALI) adopted the philoso-
phy of Greenman in section 402A of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts.15 As jurisdiction after jurisdiction followed the
ALI's lead in recognizing strict liability in tort for products, it
became clear that the days of caveat emptor were over16 and
that the plaintiff's burden under the theory was simply to
show that a product was defective or in a dangerous condition
when it left the defendant's control. 7 The problem still re-
mained, however, of determining how a plaintiff would show
that the product was defective, or as comment g to section
402A defines it, "in a condition not contemplated by the ulti-
mate consumer, which will be unreasonably dangerous tohim.,,)18
The consumer expectation test articulated in comment i29
to section 402A seemed appropriate. Strict liability in tort de-
veloped from the liability imposed for breach of an implied
warranty of merchantability, a doctrine concerned with pro-
tecting justified expectations of the consumer.20 Thus, those
liability, see, e.g., 13 A.L.R.3d 1061 n.2 (1967); Product "Design Defects," supra note
8, at 554.
13 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring).
14 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1962).
5 See note 2 supra for the text of § 402A.
,6 See, e.g., Azzarello v. Black Bros. Co., 391 A.2d 1020, 1023 (Pa. 1978). The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted the growing importance of strict liability in tort:
The development of a sophisticated and complex industrial society
with its proliferation of new products and vast changes in the private enter-
prise system has inspired a change in legal philosophy from the principle of
caveat emptor ... to the view that a supplier of products should be
deemed to be "the guarantor of his product's safety."...
Id. (citing Salvador v. Atlantic Steel Boiler Co., 319 A.2d 903, 907 (Pa. 1974)).
1 See, e.g., Reyes v. Wyeth Labs, 498 F.2d 1264, 1272 (5th Cir. 1974); Browder v.
Pettigrew, 541 S.W.2d 402 (Tenn. 1976); Birnbaum, A Re-evaluation of the Concept
of Design Defects in Products, 29 FED'N INS. COUNSEL Q. 199, 199 (1979); Fischer,
Products Liability-the Meaning of Defect, 39 Mo. L. REV. 339, 340 (1974); Phillips,
The Standard for Determining Defectiveness in Products Liability, 46 U. CIN. L.
REV. 101, 103 (1977); Product "Design Defects," supra note 8, at 553.
18 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment g at 351 (1965).
19 See note 5 supra for the language of comment i.
20 See, e.g., Fischer, supra note 17, at 348; Keeton, Product Liability and the
Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 30, 37 (1973); Wade, On the Nature of Strict
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courts adhering to the Restatement's position imposed strict
liability for physical harm much as they would have imposed
it under implied warranty; liability was imposed only where
consumer expectation had been defeated. Contractual (as op-
posed to tort) defenses such as disclaimer, lack of privity and
lack of notice, however, were not recognized. 1
The consumer expectation test was approved by some
commentators because it focused on what was seen as the pri-
mary issue in strict liability: the manufacturer's conduct as
opposed to the dangerousness of the product itself.22 More-
over, in some situations, the test worked remarkably well. It
prevented "certain types of products - whiskey, for example
- from always being regarded as unreasonably dangerous in
their normal condition"2 and barred liability in certain situa-
tions where the plaintiff could have avoided the danger, such
as where the user of an obviously sharp knife cut himself.2 4
Last, the approach had the advantage of predictability. The
use of a single standard of defectiveness made it easier to
forecast which products might be the source of liability.25
Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 833-34 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
Nature of Strict Liability]; Product "Design Defects," supra note 8, at 555. See gen-
erally Krauskopf, Products Liability, 32 Mo. L. REv. 459 (1967); Prosser, The As-
sault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1103-
14 (1960); Reitz & Seabolt, Warranties and Product Liability: Who Can Sue and
Where?, 46 TEMP. L.Q. 527 (1973).
2' See, e.g., Keener v. Dayton Elec. Mfg. Co., 445 S.W.2d 362, 364 (Mo. 1969);
U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(c) (1952 version) (providing implied warranty of merchantability,
which requires that goods be "fit for the ordinary purposes for which goods are
used"); Fischer, supra note 17, at 348; Krauskopf, supra note 20, at 469; Reitz &
Seabolt, supra note 20, at 529-30.
2 See Birnbaum, supra note 17, at 200; Keeton, supra note 20, at 37; Twerski,
From Defect to Cause to Comparative Fault-Rethinking Some Product Liability
Concepts, 60 MARQ. L. REv. 297, 299 (1977).
2 Product "Design Defects," supra note 8, at 554.
2' See Calabresi & Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81
YALE L.J. 1055 (1972); Fischer, supra note 17, at 340; Holford, The Limits of Strict
Liability for Product Design and Manufacture, 52 TEx. L. REv. 81, 89-90 (1973);
Keeton, supra note 20, at 34-35.
25 See, e.g., Orfield v. International Harvester Co., 535 F.2d 959 (6th Cir. 1976)
(applying Tenn. law); Vincer v. Esther Williams All-Aluminum Swimming Pool Co.,
230 N.W.2d 794 (Wis. 1975).
[Vol. 69
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B. Comment i Under Fire
Soon after courts began to adopt the consumer expecta-
tion standard, noted commentators in the product liability
field began to criticize that standard.26 One commentator
called it
a nebulous test-a vague and a very imprecise one-because
the ordinary consumer cannot be said to have expectations
as to safety regarding many features of the complexly made
products that are purchased, such as the risk of fire from the
way gasoline tanks are designed and installed in cars or the
magnitude of the risks of cars overturning and the like.27
Dean John Wade, Reporter of the Second Restatement,
noted that the consumer expectation test failed because, in
many situations, "the consumer would not know what to ex-
pect, because he would have no idea how safe the product
could be made. '2 8 Some saw using the test as the sole crite-
rion for definition of an unreasonably dangerous product as a
limitation on the strict liability doctrine itself, since frustra-
tion of consumer expectations was only one of several reasons
for the adoption of strict liability. Other reasons included dis-
tributing risk,29 providing safety incentives"0 and overcoming
plaintiffs' proof problems.3 1 Moreover, some commentators
2 See Birnbaum, supra note 17, at 200; Keeton, Manufacturer's Liability: The
Meaning of "Defect" in the Manufacture and Design of Products, 20 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 559 (1969); Product Liability, supra note 20, at 37; Wade, Strict Tort Liability
of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5 (1965); Nature of Strict Liability, supra note 20, at
830-34; Product "Design Defects," supra note 8, at 556.
27 Keeton, supra note 20, at 37.
28 Nature of Strict Liability, supra note 20, at 829.
29 "[T]hose engaged in the manufacturing enterprise can serve effectively as risk
distributors by accepting responsibility for accident losses attributable to the danger-
ousness of products as a cost of doing business." Product Liability, supra note 20, at
35. See Greenman v. Yuba Products, Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1962); Henningson
v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 95 (N.J. 1960); Goldberg v. Kollsman Instru-
ment Corp., 191 N.E.2d 81 (N.Y. 1963); Fischer, supra note 17, at 339; Nature of
Strict Liability, supra note 20, at 826.
30 "Risk spreading increases costs. Competition, on the other hand, forces the
manufacturer to keep costs down. This provides an incentive to develop safer prod-
ucts." Fischer, supra note 17, at 340. See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d
436, 440 (Cal. 1944); Keeton, supra note 20, at 34; Nature of Strict Liability, supra
note 20, at 826.
2' "Defective products usually result from fault, but the complexities of the mod-
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perceived the test as requiring that any dangerous product be
held legally acceptable as long as the ordinary consumer
would not be surprised by it.3 2 Thus, while the commentators
did not recommend total abandonment of the comment i ap-
proach,33 the consumer expectation test clearly had come into
disfavor.
II. JurCLAL REJECTION OF COMMENT i
As commentators found flaws in the language and viabil-
ity of comment i, it was inevitable that some courts would also
question its effectiveness. The California Supreme Court was
one of the first courts to reject the Restatement standard of
unreasonably dangerous in the case of a patent design de-
fect.34 In, Luque v. McLean,35 the product contained an obvi-
ern manufacturing process make this very difficult to prove. This problem is circum-
vented by imposing strict liability." Fischer, supra note 17, at 340. See Keeton, supra
note 20, at 34; Nature of Strict Liability, supra note 20, at 826.
31 Darling, The Patent Danger Rule: An Analysis and a Survey of its Vitality,
29 MERCER L. REv. 583, 598-99 (1978); Donaher, Piehler, Twerski and Weinstein, The
Technological Expert in Products Liability Litigation, 52 Tax. L. REV. 1303, 1304-05
(1974); Keeton, supra note 20, at 35. "If frustration of consumer expectations as to
the nature and quality of a product were the only basis for shifting losses without
fault, recovery would be limited to those harmed in damaging events attributable to
risks of which consumers were unaware." Id.
" See notes 51-68 infra and accompanying text for alternatives to the consumer
expectation test which have been offered by commentators and utilized by some
courts.
" The California Supreme Court previously had decided in Cronin v. J.B.E. 01-
son Corp., 501 P.2d 1153, 1155 (Cal. 1972), to move away from the Restatement's
standard for determining a defective product. Thus, while the Restatement required
that an actionable product be in a "defective condition unreasonably dangerous to
the user or consumer," the court in Cronin held that a plaintiff need only prove a
defective product. See also Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 555
P.2d 42 (Alaska 1976); Glass v. Ford Motor Co., 309 A.2d 562 (N.J. Super. 1973).
Cronin was not followed elsewhere. A number of courts gave thorough and
careful consideration to the problem and determined to retain the Restate-
ment's unreasonably-dangerous [sic] approach-usually with some basis for
translating it to the jury in terms of reasonable expectations or reasonable-
ness in putting the product on the market in that condition, or a combina-
tion of the two.
Product "Design Defects," supra note 8, at 557.
It was not until Luque v. McLean, 501 P.2d 1163 (Cal. 1944), however, that the
California Supreme Court addressed the concept of consumer expectation or the pres-
ence of a patent danger as not precluding a finding of strict liability.
35 501 P.2d 1163 (Cal. 1972).
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ous defect, an unguarded hole in a power rotary lawn mower.
The product was still found to be defective, however, because
an inexpensive modification of the design could have elimi-
nated the danger. 6 In so holding, the court harkened back to
the policies underlying the adoption of strict liability, which
had first been articulated in Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod-
ucts, Inc.Y If the purpose of strict liability is to insure that
the costs of injuries resulting from defective products be
borne by the manufacturer rather than by the consumer, 8 the
court reasoned that existence of a patent defect in the product
is no reason to preclude recovery.39
In the wake of commentary attacking the rule, other ju-
risdictions followed the Luque approach. In rejecting con-
sumer expectations as an absolute defense to strict liability,
the Kentucky Supreme Court in Nichols v. Union Underwear
Co.40 noted that seventeen jurisdictions still accepted the test,
while eighteen had repudiated it, and sixteen, including Ken-
tucky, had not addressed the issue.41 Actually, the Court had
joined a larger majority than it supposed. The consumer ex-
pectations test, or patent danger rule, now appears to have
been repudiated in at least twenty-two jurisdictions.42 The
'1 Id. at 1166, 1169.
3 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1962).
-1 Id. at 901.
3 Luque v. McLean, 501 P.2d at 1169.
40 602 S.W.2d 429 (Ky. 1980).
4 Id. at 432 (citing Darling, supra note 32, at 604-09).
42 Alabama: Beloit Corp. v. Harrell, 339 So.2d 992 (Ala. 1976).
Alaska: Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d 42 (Alaska
1976) (rejecting patent danger or consumer expectation as an absolute defense).
Arizona: Byrns v. Riddell, Inc., 550 P.2d 1065 (Ariz. 1976).
California: Henderson v. Harnischfeger Corp., 527 P.2d 353 (Cal. 1974); Luque v.
McLean, 501 P.2d 1163 (Cal. 1972).
Colorado: Union Supply Co. v. Pust, 583 P.2d 276 (Colo. 1978). In Pust, the Col-
orado Supreme Court noted that the "open and obvious" rule apparently originated
in the New York case of Campo v. Scofield, 95 N.E.2d 802 (N.Y. 1950), discussed in
note 53 infra. The court noted further that the rule had been attacked from its incep-
tion by legal scholars and argued that application of the rule amounted to using "an
assumption of the risk defense as a matter of law" in strict liability cases. The court
therefore held that "[s]imply because a hazard is 'open and obvious' does not prevent
it from being unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer. Approval of the rule
would be contrary to sound public policy." 583 P.2d at 284.
Connecticut: Wheeler v. Standard Tool & Mfg. Co., 359 F. Supp. 298, 302
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test appears still viable in seventeen jurisdictions,43 while the
(S.D.N.Y. 1973), af'd, 497 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1974). As the Connecticut courts had not
addressed the validity of the consumer expectation test, the federal district court
looked to the law of neighboring jurisdictions, especially that of New Jersey, and trea-
tises to determine the position the Connecticut courts would take.
Florida: Auburn Mach. Works Co., Inc. v. Jones, 366 So.2d 1167 (Fla. 1979). Flor-
ida, which had previously applied the rule, rejected it in Jones, wherein the Florida
Supreme Court noted that the modern trend is to abandon the strict patent danger
doctrine as an exception to liability. Said the court, "[t]he patent danger doctrine
encourages manufacturers to be outrageous in their design, to eliminate safety de-
vices, and to make hazards obvious." Id. at 1170. Accordingly, the court rejected the
rule, concluding that it did not create an absolute exception to liability on the part of
the manufacturer.
Indiana: Bemis Co. v. Rubush, 401 N.E.2d 48 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980). Indiana previ-
ously had accepted consumer expectations as the one factor to be considered in deter-
mining whether a product was unreasonably dangerous. In Bemis, consumer expecta-
tions became just one of the factors to be considered. Id. at 56-57.
Iowa: Hawkeye-Security Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 174 N.W.2d 672 (Iowa 1970).
Kentucky: Nichols v. Union Underwear Co., 602 S.W.2d 429 (Ky. 1980).
Michigan: Krugh v. Miehle Co., 503 F.2d 121 (6th Cir. 1974). See also Darling,
supra note 32, at 607 n.182.
Montana: Brown v. North Am. Mfg. Co., 576 P.2d 711 (Mont. 1978). "Defendant
here advances the 'open and obvious danger' or 'patent-latent' rule as a bar to plain-
tiff's recovery ... We reject such a rule. Recent authorities in other jurisdictions
that previously adopted the rule have now abolished it in persuasive, well reasoned
opinions." Id. at 717.
New Hampshire: Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 395 A.2d 843 (N.H. 1978).
New Jersey: Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 207 A.2d 314 (N.J. 1965).
New York: Micallef v. Miehle Co., 348 N.E.2d 571 (N.Y. 1976). New York previ-
ously had protected manufacturers of products posing patent or obvious dangers in
Campo v. Schofield, 95 N.E.2d 802 (N.Y. 1950). While some courts have viewed
Campo as the beginning of the patent danger or consumer expectations rule (see, e.g.,
note 43 supra), Campo actually predated the imposition of strict liability and was a
negligence action. However, since the test articulated in comment i can be viewed as
the ALI's adoption of the patent danger rule for strict liability cases, Campo cannot
be ignored. In fact, when the New York court decided Micallef, it noted that "the
time has come to depart from the patent danger rule enunciated in Campo." 348
N.E.2d at 573.
North Dakota: Olson v. A.W. Chesterton Co., 256 N.W.2d 530 (N.D. 1977).
Oklahoma: Hood v. Formatron Corp., 488 P.2d 1281 (Okla. 1971) (age of the in-
jured party affects the applicability of the latent-patent defect instruction).
Oregon: Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 525 P.2d 1033 (Or. 1974).
Pennsylvania: Azzarello v. Black Bros. Co., 391 A.2d 1020 (Pa. 1978).
Texas: Rourke v. Garza, 530 S.W.2d 794 (Tex. 1975).
Washington: Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Tabert, 542 P.2d 774 (Wash. 1975).
West Virginia: Morningstar v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 253 S.E.2d 666 (W. Va.
1979).
43 Georgia: Poppell v. Waters, 190 S.E.2d 815 (Ga. 1972).
Illinois: Weiss v. Rockwell Mfg. Co., 293 N.E.2d 375 (Ill. App. 1973).
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issue apparently has not yet been addressed in twelve
jurisdictions."'
Thus, the Kentucky Supreme Court joined a growing plu-
Kansas: Hartman v. Miller Hydro Co., 499 F.2d 191 (10th Cir. 1974).
Louisiana: Tri-State Ins. Co. v. Fidelity & Cas. Ins. Co., 364 So.2d 657 (La. Ct.
App. 1978).
Maryland: Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Young, 321 A.2d 737 (Md. 1974).
Minnesota: Halvorson v. American Hoist & Derrick Co., 240 N.W.2d 303 (Minn.
1976).
Mississippi: Harrist v. Spencer-Harris Tool Co., 140 So.2d 558 (Miss. 1962).
Missouri: Stevens v. Durbin-Durco, Inc. 377 S.W.2d 343 (Mo. 1964).
Nebraska: Waegli v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 251 N.W.2d 370 (Neb. 1977).
Nevada: Outboard Marine Corp. v. Schupbach, 561 P.2d 370 (Nev. 1977).
New Mexico: Skyhook Corp. v. Jasper, 560 P.2d 934 (N.M. 1977).
North Carolina: Douglas v. W.C. Mallison & Son, 144 S.E.2d 138 (N.C. 1965).
Ohio: Burkhard v. Short, 275 N.E.2d 632 (Ohio 1971).
Utah: Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Armco Steel Co., 601 P.2d 152 (Utah 1979).
Virginia: Jamieson v. Woodward & Lothrop, 247 F.2d 23 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
355 U.S. 855 (1957).
Wisconsin: Vincer v. Esther Williams All-Aluminum Swimming Pool Co., 230
N.W.2d 794 (Wis. 1975), is most frequently cited for the proposition that Wisconsin
accepts the consumer expectation or patent danger test. It must be noted, however,
that in a 1975 case the Seventh Circuit, applying Wisconsin law, refused to allow the
presence of a patent danger as an absolute bar to recovery.
[T]he more recent trend of the cases ... opts instead in favor of an
approach which reflects an effort to "discourage" misdesign rather than en-
couraging it in its obvious form .... [N]o distinction should be made be-
tween products whose dangers are obvious or latent to the user in order to
discourage misdesign even in its obvious form ....
... [W]e are of the opinion that the question of whether a danger is
open and obvious to a user of a particular instrumentality is not a matter
which should be determined in a vacuum. Rather, the unique facts of each
case should bear on the question, and this, in our opinion, includes the sta-
tus, intelligence, and more importantly, the training of the particular user
involved.
Collins v. Ridge Tool Co., 520 F.2d 591, 595-96 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S.
949 (1976).
Wyoming: Parker v. Heasler Plumbing & Heating Co., 388 P.2d 516 (Wyo. 1964).
44 Idaho: Mico Mobile Sales & Leasing, Inc. v. Skyline Corp., 546 P.2d 54 (Idaho
1975).
Massachusetts: Carson v. American Safety Equip. Corp., 528 F.2d 384 (1st Cir.
1976).
South Carolina: Sanders v. Western Auto Supply Co., 183 S.E.2d 321 (S.C. 1971).
Tennessee: Orfield v. International Harvester Co., 535 F.2d 959 (6th Cir. 1976)
(applying Tennessee law).
Vermont: Menard v. Newhall, 373 A.2d 505 (Vt. 1977). In addition to the above
states, other jurisdictions which apparently have not ruled on the consumer expecta-
tion test are Arkansas, Delaware, the District of Columbia, Hawaii, Maine, Rhode
Island and South Dakota.
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rality of jurisdictions that have decided that consumer knowl-
edge is not the only factor a jury should consider in determin-
ing whether a product is unreasonably dangerous.45
III. ALTERNATIVES TO COMMENT i
A. The Void Left by Nichols
Although it rejected a jury instruction based solely on the
language of comment i, the Kentucky Supreme Court, in
Nichols v. Union Underwear Co.,4 6 declined to set out an ex-
clusive list of other factors that could be utilized by a jury in a
products liability case. 7 Instead, it held that the facts of each
particular case should determine which factors are relevant. 48
Therefore, while the court provided a proper jury instruction
for a new trial on the Nichols facts, it failed to provide guide-
lines for other products liability actions.49 Thus, as the con-
curring opinion declared the majority opinion left Kentucky
45 Moreover, in analyzing the significance of those jurisdictions which have re-
tained the consumer expectation test, one commentator noted that most of the deci-
sions repudiating the rule or test had been made since 1970 and warned:
(1) many of the cases which apply the rule are older cases by product lia-
bility standards;
(2) a later decision can easily distinguish a case which appears to apply
the rule on the basis that patency had been a deciding element on the par-
ticular facts, but had not laid down a per se rule that patent dangers were
not actionable;
(3) a decision based on § 402A can easily distinguish an earlier case which
applied the patent danger rule on the basis that it was a negligence action;
and
(4) many of the decisions which applied the rule were handed down prior
to the outpouring of commentary attacking the rule.
Darling, supra note 32, at 606.
46 602 S.W.2d 429 (Ky. 1980).
47 Id. at 433. In Jones v. Hutchinson Mfg., Inc., 502 S.W.2d 66 (Ky. 1973), the
Court had discussed deviation from industry standards as a factor, and in Ulrich v.
Kasco Abrasives Co., 532 S.W.2d 197 (Ky. 1976), it had recognized the obviousness of
the danger and the presence of a warning as relevant.
48 602 S.W.2d at 433.
49 The Court held that in the event of another trial, the jury should be
instructed:
You will find for the plaintiff only if you are satisfied from the evidence
that the material of which the T-shirt was made created such a risk of its
being accidentally set on fire by a child wearing it that an ordinarily pru-
dent company engaged in the manufacture of clothing, being fully aware of
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products liability law unnecessarily vague.5"
B. The Model Uniform Product Liability Act
In Nichols, the Court called to the state legislature's at-
tention the Model Uniform Product Liability Act (MUPLA);
the Act is an effort by the United States Department of Com-
merce to achieve more uniformity in product liability law."
MUPLA, which has been championed by commentators,
lists five factors to be taken into account by a jury in a design
defect case such as Nichols:
(1) The likelihood at the time of manufacture that the
product would cause the harm suffered by the claimant;
(2) The seriousness of harm;
(3) The technological feasibility of manufacturing a prod-
the risk, would not have put it on the market; otherwise, you will find for
the defendant.
Id.
Go Id. at 434 (Lukowsky, J., concurring).
" The Court commented:
It seems to us that the entire field of product liability law is especially fer-
tile for comprehensive legislative review and action. Its rows need to be sta-
bly defined by legislative survey of the socio-economic policies which deter-
mine its contours. Additionally, uniformity of law among all the states may
be desirable because product liability insurance rates are set on a country-
wide basis. Thus, the current system of having individual state courts de-
velop product liability law on a case-to-case basis is not consistent with
commercial necessity. Uniformity and stability in this area are desirable if
product liability insurance rates are to be stabilized at reasonable levels.
Id. at 432 n.1.
'2 See, e.g., Product "Design Defects," supra note 8, at 576. Dean Wade ex-
plained the need for the Act:
Not only does the common law of products liability need to be fair and
evenhanded to all classes of persons, it also needs to be as nearly uniform as
possible. Products are marketed nationwide, and uniform treatment is high-
ly desirable. Much of the commercial law in this country has been reduced
to a uniform commercial code, adopted throughout the United States. The
Uniform Law Commissioners have not undertaken to prepare a uniform
products liability act, but the United States Department of Commerce has
labored long and carefully to prepare a Model Uniform Product Liability
Act, which it recommends for adoption by the states. It may be that some
time in the future this Act will attain widespread adoption. In the
meantime, its provisions may well prove very helpful to the state courts as
they proceed with their responsibility of molding and adapting the common
law of products liability.
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uct designed so as to have prevented claimant's harm;
(4) The relative costs of producing, distributing, and sell-
ing such an alternative design; and
(5) The new or additional harms that may result from such
an alternative design53
Despite a need for a uniform law in the field of product
liability, given the void created by Nichols, there is no guar-
antee that the Kentucky General Assembly will follow the
Kentucky Supreme Court's gentle nudging and adopt
MUPLA. In the absence of legislative action or specific judi-
cial guidance, however, Kentucky judges are without a stan-
dard definition for "unreasonably dangerous."
C. The Utility-Risk Balancing Test
1. The Wade/Keeton Approach
As a result of the criticism of the consumer expectation
standard for an unreasonably dangerous product, various al-
ternatives have been offered. Dean Wade proposed that the
jury be asked to determine "whether the magnitude of the
risk created by the dangerous condition of the product was
outweighed by the social utility attained by putting it out in
this fashion."" Under Wade's approach, the jury would con-
sider and weigh the following factors:
(1) The usefulness and desirability of the product-its util-
ity to the user and to the public as a whole.
(2) The safety aspects of the product-the likelihood that
it will cause injury, and the probable seriousness of the
injury.
(3) The availability of a substitute product which would
meet the same need and not be as unsafe.
(4) The manufacturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe
character of the product without impairing its usefulness or
making it too expensive to maintain its utility.
(5) The user's ability to avoid danger by the exercise of
care in the use of the product.
(6) The user's anticipated awareness of the dangers inher-
53 44 Fed. Reg. 2996, 2998 (1979).
"Nature of Strict Liability, supra note 20, at 835.
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ent in the product and their avoidabiity, because of general
public knowledge of the obvious condition of the product, or
of the existence of suitable warnings or instructions.
(7) The feasibility, on the part of the manufacturer, of
spreading the loss by setting the price of the product or
carrying liability insurance.55
Wade cautioned that not every factor will be appropriate in
each lawsuit but recognized that where a factor is significant,
a jury should be so informed.5 6
Dean Page Keeton also called for a balancing test:
A product is defective if it is unreasonably dangerous as
marketed. It is unreasonably dangerous if a reasonable per-
son would conclude that the magnitude of the scientifically
perceivable danger as it proved to be at the time of the trial
outweighed the benefits of the way the product was designed
and marketed. Under the heading of benefits one would in-
clude anything that gives utility of some kind to the prod-
uct; one would also include the infeasibility and additional
cost of making a safer product.57
In applying the utility-risk balancing test, a court would con-
sider all of the policies underlying strict liability-risk spread-
ing, safety incentives, frustration of consumer expectations
and proof problems.58 Thus, while this test goes beyond the
55 Id. at 837-38.
11 Id. at 840.
7 Keeton, supra note 20, at 37-38 (emphasis in original).
I' Professor Fischer suggests the following approach:
In deciding when to impose strict liability, courts should consider, in light
of the facts of the particular case, the merits of the policies underlying
strict liability and balance these considerations against countervailing fac-
tors. Some of the factors that should be considered are as follows:
I. Risk Spreading
A. From the point of view of the consumer.
1. Ability of consumer to bear loss.
2. Feasibility and effectiveness of self-protective measures.
a. Knowledge of risk.
b. Ability to control danger.
c. Feasibility of deciding against use of product.
B. From point of view of manufacturer.
1. Knowledge of risk.
2. Accuracy of prediction of losses.
3. Size of losses.
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position taken by the majority in Nichols, it is consistent with
the holding in that case because the Nichols Court did not
reject any of the specific factors that have been suggested for
use in a utility-risk balancing test.
2. The Concurring Opinion in Nichols
Although the majority in Nichols failed to specify an ap-
propriate test, Justice Lukowsky, in a concurring opinion, re-
cited the Wade/Keeton formula almost verbatim and con-
cluded that "whether a design is unreasonably dangerous
must be determined by a social utility standard-risk versus
benefit."59 Indeed, since the majority opinion clearly supports
consideration of more than mere consumer expectation and
does not eliminate any particular factors from consideration,
the inference exists that the Court may yet adopt the utility-
risk balancing test. Just as it waited until a majority of juris-
dictions rejected the patent danger or consumer expectation
test before rejecting it as the test for Kentucky juries to em-
4. Availability of insurance.
5. Ability of manufacturer to self-insure.
6. Effect of increased prices on industry.
7. Public necessity for the product.
8. Deterrent effect on the development of new products.
II. Safety Incentives
A. Likelihood of future product improvement.
B. Existence of additional precautions that can presently be taken.
C. Availability of safer substitutes.
Fischer, supra note 17, at 359.
89 602 S.W.2d at 434 (Lukowsky, J., concurring). Justice Lukowsky wrote:
The bottom line is that the trier of fact is required to balance two pairs of
factors existing at the time of manufacture: (1) the likelihood that the prod-
uct would cause the claimants harm or similar harms, and the seriousness
of those harms; against (2) the manufacturer's burden of designing a prod-
uct that would have prevented those harms, and the adverse effect that
alternative design would have on the usefulness of the product ....
In the event of another trial, I believe the jury should be instructed as
follows:
You will find for the plaintiff if you are satisfied from the evi-
dence that at the time of the manufacture of the cotton and poly-
ester T-shirt the risk of harm from its being accidentally set on
fire while being worn by a child outweighed the benefit to the
public from its availability in the marketplace. Otherwise, you
will find for the defendant.
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ploy, the Court may be waiting for broad acceptance of the
Wade/Keeton formula before adopting it.
3. The Balancing Test in Operation
Some courts have already adopted a utility-risk standard.
In Barker v. Lull Engineering Co.,6 0 the California Supreme
Court noted that it had previously rejected the "unreasonably
dangerous" terminology of the Restatement because that
standard allowed a defendant to avoid "liability so long as the
product did not fall below the ordinary consumer's expecta-
tions as to the product's safety."61 The court, however, viewed
the Restatement as flawed only because it treated consumer
expectations as a "ceiling" on a manufacturer's responsibility
under strict liability rather than as a "floor. '6 2 Therefore, it
adopted a two-pronged definition of design defect:
[A] court may properly instruct a jury that a product is de-
fective in design if (1) the plaintiff proves that the product
failed to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would
expect when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable
manner, or (2) the plaintiff proves that the product's design
proximately caused his injury and the defendant fails to
prove, in light of the relevant factors, that on balance the
benefits of the challenged design outweigh the risk of danger
inherent in such design.6"
The relevant factors to be considered by a jury under the
Barker approach would include the "gravity of the danger
posed by the challenged design, the likelihood that such dan-
ger would occur, the mechanical feasibility of a safer alterna-
tive design, the financial cost of an improved design, and the
adverse consequences to the product and to the consumer that
would result from an alternative design."'" In other words, the
jury would apply a utility-risk test.
60 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978) (action involving an alleged design defect in a highlift
loader). Barker was followed by the Alaska Supreme Court in Caterpillar Tractor Co.
v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 884-87 (Alaska 1979).
81 573 P.2d at 451.
62 Id. at n.7.
68 Id. at 452.
64 Id. at 455.
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The Texas Supreme Court in Turner v. General Motors
Corp.6 5 faced a situation similar to that faced by the Ken-
tucky Supreme Court in Nichols. Texas had earlier adopted
the Restatement approach that, to be actionable, a product
had to be unreasonably dangerous; this concept was explained
to the jury by a bifurcated test of whether it (1) would meet
the reasonable expectations of the ordinary consumer as to its
safety, or (2) be placed on the market by a prudent manufac-
turer who was aware of the danger involved in its alleged de-
fect. On appeal, the court agreed with the intermediate court
that the jury instruction was in errors$ but, as did the Ken-
tucky Court, refused to hold that a jury should be specifically
instructed on any given set of factors.6 7 However, the Texas
court did hold that a defectively designed product means "a
product that is unreasonably dangerous as designed, taking
into consideration the utility of the product and the risk in-
volved in its use."68 Although the Texas Supreme Court failed
to require that the jury should be instructed on specific fac-
tors, it nonetheless adopted the language espoused by Wade
and Keeton.
CONCLUSION
With Nichols v. Union Underwear Co., Kentucky became
one of a growing number of jurisdictions to reject the con-
sumer expectation test and its harsh effects on the possibili-
ties for recovery. Because even the reporter for the Restate-
ment has criticized the consumer expectation test, the
Kentucky Supreme Court stood on solid legal ground when it
abandoned comment i as a basis for a jury instruction in a
design defect case. Yet the Court could better serve the needs
of trial judges by adopting the utility-risk approach advocated
" 584 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. 1979) (involving the defective design of a car roof that
caved in as the car rolled over).
" Id. at 851. The court's conclusion resulted from "inclusiveness of the idea that
jurors would know what ordinary consumers would expect in the consumption or use
of a product, or that jurors would or could apply any standard or test outside that of
their own experiences and expectations." Id.
67 Id. at 847-48.
" Id. at 847 n.1.
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by Deans Wade and Keeton and by Justice Lukowsky in his
concurring opinion in Nichols. Had it done so, the Court
would have provided guidelines to trial judges who will pre-
side over product liability cases factually different from Nich-
ols. Instead, as the field of product liability now stands in
Kentucky, trial judges who determine which factors are con-
sidered by juries in such cases cannot know with any degree of
certainty whether they have correctly instructed their juries.
The Kentucky Supreme Court should eliminate that uncer-
tainty and follow the lead of other jurisdictions by holding
that, considering all relevant factors, a manufacturer is liable
if the risk inherent in his product outweighs its utility to the
public.
Elsa Goss Black
